PelAC warns the EU is losing leverage in mackerel talks as non‑EU states overfish, delay decisions and threaten the EU’s share, stability and fleets
EU’s Negotiating Position Shows Structural Weakness
The Pelagic Advisory Council (PelAC) has delivered one of its most direct warnings to date, outlining in detail how the EU’s position in the Northeast Atlantic mackerel negotiations has eroded to a point that several core interests; quota share, stock sustainability and negotiating credibility, are now simultaneously at risk.
The letter, sent today, Friday 13 February 2026 to Director‑General Charlina Vitcheva, provides a forensic breakdown of the failures that have accumulated across multiple negotiation cycles and identifies systemic vulnerabilities that have left the EU exposed.
Talks Produce No Decisions Despite Escalating Risks
The most recent Coastal States consultations on 26–27 January ended without a single concrete outcome. No agreement on TAC. No progress on shares. No commitments beyond meeting again in early March — weeks later, with the fishing season already in motion for some Member States.
PelAC’s analysis makes clear that this is not a simple delay. It is evidence of a negotiation environment in which the EU has lost agenda‑setting power. The absence of decisions means the EU cannot shape TAC levels, cannot stabilise the market, and cannot offer clarity to its own fleets.
This failure compounds months of gridlock dating back to autumn 2025.
Four Non‑EU Parties Now Control De Facto Stock Management
PelAC confirms that the UK, Norway, Iceland and the Faroe Islands are signalling they will set a TAC above the EU position. This is the pivotal issue running through the entire letter.
It means the EU, historically a central mackerel power, is now operating inside a framework where four non‑EU parties effectively impose the management trajectory of the stock.
The EU’s 21.85% share is described as “under threat”, not in a rhetorical sense but structurally: if these states set a higher TAC, the EU becomes the only actor from the major parties voluntarily restraining itself.
This is where PelAC’s tone hardens.
EU Concessions Would Directly Benefit Non‑Compliant States
PelAC warns that any EU decision to adopt a lower TAC for negotiation purposes is “untenable”. Lowering its catch level would not increase leverage. It would simply open space for non‑EU states, which PelAC notes have unilaterally exceeded advised catch levels in recent years, to fill the gap and benefit again at the EU’s expense.
This section of the letter underscores a key investigative finding:
EU compliance has produced no reciprocal behaviour and has instead weakened its negotiating standing.
Overfishing by Non‑EU States Has Directly Damaged the Stock
PelAC links the depleted biomass and reduced recruitment directly to unilateral catch overruns by non‑EU Coastal States. It states plainly that the EU has remained compliant while others have systematically breached sustainable limits.
This is one of the clearest assignments of responsibility PelAC has issued.
It also sets the foundation for a pivotal question PelAC raises: whether the Commission is prepared to activate Regulation (EU) No 1026/2012 — the sanctions mechanism designed specifically for this scenario.
The request for clarification signals:
- The Council believes conditions for activation may now be met.
- Non‑EU states are seen as driving stock decline while expanding political leverage.
- The EU’s past reluctance to use the regulation may now be part of the problem.
EU Isolation in 2025 Negotiations Has Created Long‑Term Harm
PelAC says the EU must “move beyond the isolated position” it held in autumn 2025. This phrase is revealing: it points to a period when the EU found itself politically outmanoeuvred in multilateral settings and unable to shift positions of the four‑party bloc.
The Council suggests this isolation allowed others to entrench unilateral approaches and weaken the EU’s regional influence.
Full TAC Sharing Agreement Remains the Only Path Out
PelAC states that a comprehensive sharing agreement is the only viable route to re‑establish equilibrium. Without it, talks about historic shares, long‑term strategies or stock rebuilding cannot advance in any credible way.
The message is that the EU has no tactical alternatives left:
- No bilateral workaround.
- No scientific process that can substitute political agreement.
- No unilateral move that improves leverage.
Risk of EU Exclusion From Key Management Processes
PelAC highlights a deeper structural risk: that the EU could become marginalised from discussions that now integrate TAC levels, share keys and management strategy evaluations.
Such processes require the EU’s scientific and institutional capacity. If the four‑party bloc continues consolidating control, PelAC warns that long‑term management may drift away from objective science and towards self‑serving quota expansion.
EU–UK Relationship Now a Critical Pressure Point
Under the Trade and Cooperation Agreement, the EU and UK must consult on TAC levels. PelAC stresses that this bilateral mechanism cannot remain passive.
If the EU fails to fully mobilise the UK channel, the four‑party bloc effectively becomes a three‑plus‑one bloc where the UK participates strategically rather than cooperatively.
PelAC makes it clear that the EU cannot afford that dynamic in the coming weeks.
Fleets Already Experiencing Operational and Market Instability
PelAC identifies socio‑economic impacts that are no longer hypothetical. Pelagic operators face disrupted planning cycles, unstable market conditions and rising employment uncertainty.
The Council calls for financial support instruments to be activated where appropriate to stabilise responsible operators who have complied with agreed rules.
This is a warning that instability is already embedded in the 2026 season.
Long‑Term Management Recommendations Still Unaddressed
PelAC closes by signposting its wide‑ranging recommendations on short‑, medium‑ and long‑term management from its 2025 benchmark advice.
Their inclusion signals that broader structural reforms remain pending, and that the EU has yet to address several deep‑rooted governance weaknesses highlighted previously.
